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Abstract
The ability to deliver optimal medical care in the setting of a disaster event, regardless of its cause, will
in large part be contingent on an immediately available supply of key medical equipment, supplies, and
pharmaceuticals. Although the Department of Health and Human Services Strategic National Stockpile
program makes these available through its 12-hour ‘‘push packs’’ and vendor-managed inventory, every
local community should be funded to create a local cache for these items. This report explores the funding
requirements for this suggested approach. Furthermore, the response to a surge in demand for care will be
contingent on keeping available staff close to the hospitals for a sustained period. A proposal for accom-
plishing this, with associated costs, is discussed as well.
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L
ocal preparedness efforts for mass casualty
management,whether terrorist induced, otherwise
man-made, or secondary to a natural phenome-
non, have focused on the use of hospitals or health care
facilities for the placement of the great majority of
patients generated by such events. Traditional disaster
planning has largely concentrated on ‘‘fixed occurrence’’
events, such as those created by transportation acci-
dents, in which there are a finite number of victims
requiring hospitalization. The ‘‘mass assassination’’ ter-
rorist attacks of 2001, the threat from emerging infec-
tious diseases, or the proclivity of terrorists to threaten
large populations with unconventional weapons, includ-
ing the use of bioterrorist agents, all create the urgent
need for communities to improve on current capabilities.
Communities must create solutions that effectively ex-
tend the ability to deliver uninterrupted medical care in
the face of an extended, longer-term event. A recent ex-
ample of this was the crisis faced by hospitals in the cities
of Hong Kong and Toronto as they struggled with their
management of severe acute respiratory syndrome and
the effect this transmissible emerging infectious disease
had on the health care delivery systems of these cities.
Comprehensive preparedness must include the ability
to provide for ‘‘surge capacity,’’ the common parlance
used to describe the need for creating and staffing addi-
tional beds used for patient evaluation, diagnosis, moni-
toring, and treatment. ‘‘Surge’’ can be defined as the
ability to rapidly meet increased demand for medical
care. ‘‘Capacity’’ refers to a measure of the ability to ab-
sorb the increase in number of patients. This definition
does not necessarily imply the presence of ‘‘demand
over time.’’ It also does not specifically imply ‘‘capability,’’
which suggests the availability of specialty medical care
delivery, such as burn, trauma, pediatric, or intensive
care, for example. The extent of available medical capabil-
ity in a disaster environment will necessarily need to be
decided ahead of time by the community planners respon-
sible for the provision of health and medical services.
DEFINITIONS OF SURGE CAPACITY
Because disasters can be divided into two broad cate-
gories (fixed vs. extended events), so too must surge
capacity be provided for each of these two distinct
types of events. ‘‘Health care facility surge capacity’’ is
the term that should be applied to the ability of each
and every hospital to discharge existing patients to
make those hospital beds available for incoming disaster
event patients. In addition, this term should be applied to
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the creative use of available space by a health care facility
for the initial management of disaster victims. Examples
of the creation of internal surge capacity abound from
the experiences of health care systems most closely
affected by the attacks in New York City and northern
Virginia in September 2001. Inova Health System (Falls
Church, VA) hospitals, for example, implemented their
facility disaster plans, which included the expedited
discharge of patients already designated to go home
sometime that dayor thosedeemed stable enough for con-
tinued management of their medical conditions at home.
These plans also involved the cancellation of elective sur-
geries and the completion of all ongoing surgical cases.
Thus, a surge capacity of 343 hospital beds (out of ap-
proximately 1,500 beds across this health system) and 43
operating rooms was made available within three hours
of the attack on the Pentagon.1Many hospitals, in addition
to creating such inpatient availability, also have plans to
extendemergencydepartment capability, suchasbyusing
lobby and waiting room areas and other patient care
areas typically reserved for specialty patients undergoing
gastroenterology, pulmonary, and cardiac procedures.
‘‘Community surge capacity,’’ or the development of
‘‘alternate medical facilities,’’ can be used when health
care facility surge capacity is maximized and is much
more complicated and difficult to achieve. Planning for
this contingency should be based on the pre-event des-
ignation of identified facilities that can be used to accom-
modate patients, albeit under circumstances in which the
delivery of medical care may be limited or compromised.
Because these are not health care facilities, many limita-
tions exist in their overall ability to support the medical
mission of continued health care delivery. However, pre-
established logistical support, protocol development, and
specific mission goals can be harnessed to create addi-
tional capacity for patients in the case of a large-scale di-
saster event that overwhelms existing health and medical
resources.1–4
EVIDENCE OF SURGE IN PAST EVENTS
A number of events occurring over the past decade
have demonstrated the certainty with which a surge in
demand for care following disaster events will occur.
While the most recent events along the Gulf Coast of the
United States demonstrated that catastrophic disruption
of health care services can occur from natural disasters,5
a number of landmark terrorist attacks have also demon-
strated a similar strain on health care resources, albeit of
a much more limited nature.
The recognition of surge capacity as an issue requiring
attention was probably first highlighted in the aftermath
of the Aum Shinrikyo sarin gas attacks in the Tokyo
subway system in March 1995. As a result of that attack,
984 patients required hospitalization, while 4,023 patients
were evaluated in Tokyo hospital emergency depart-
ments and released.6 This equated to a surge in demand
for care of approximately five patients seeking treatment
for every one patient that was hospitalized (1:5 ratio).
As a result of the World Trade Center collapse in New
York City in 2001, the five emergency departments in
lower Manhattan closest to Ground Zero also noted a
surge in patient care in the immediate aftermath of the
event. A total of 139 patients required hospitalization, al-
though 790 patients presented for evaluation in the first
48 hours following the collapse.7 This equated to a surge
in demand for care of approximately ten patients seeking
care foreveryonepatient thatwashospitalized (1:10 ratio).
Barely two months later in that same year, the experi-
ence of one health care institution with the successful
diagnosis, treatment, and management of inhalational
anthrax in theWashington, DC, metropolitan area, where
a number of congressional staffers and U.S. Postal Ser-
vice employees were exposed to the deadly spores, sug-
gests that in the case of bioterror attack, and possibly in
the setting of a novel emerging infectious disease, many
more people may present for evaluation and diagnosis.
The emergency department of Inova Fairfax Hospital,
for example, diagnosed two confirmed inhalational an-
thrax cases and screened more than 1,127 patients with
influenza-like symptoms or concerns of anthrax exposure
over a two-week period beginning with the delivery of
the anthrax spores to the Hart Senate Office Building.8
In this instance, the ratio of infected patients as compared
with potential exposures was 1:500, a marked shift in the
amount of surge demand that is generated in response
to a disaster event.
Four discrete events, one each caused by biological,
chemical, and large-scale conventional terror attacks,
and a natural disaster, each support the need to establish
an all-hazards approach to acute care surge capacity.
KEY PLANNING ASSUMPTIONS
Review of these recent disaster events that generated
definable surges in demand for care also validates a
number of important assumptions regarding the devel-
opment of acute care surge capacity. First and foremost,
the rate-limiting step in mounting any coordinated re-
sponse to a surge in demand for care will likely be the
sustained availability of staffing. Whether it is as a result
of the use of weapons of mass exposure, including bio-
logical, chemical, or radiologic attacks; the result of a
contagious, infectious disease; or a result of widespread
disruption in civil services, it must be assumed that staff-
ing will be a problem. With the use of weapons of mass
exposure in particular, workforce attitudinal surveys sug-
gest that one fourth to one third of the workforce may be
deliberately absent for some period.9,10
Another key issue to recognize is that surge demand
for care occurs in the context of continued delivery of ba-
sic health care services. Hospital services will be required
to maintain routine delivery of emergency care. In fact,
some researchers have noted that certain conditions,
particularly those related to cardiovascular events, may
even increase in times of great stress related to disaster.
However, the level of staffing needed to match this in-
crease in demand for care is not likely to be achieved,
particularly in the setting of catastrophic disaster or
those events related to contagious infectious disease.
Decisions will have to be made in the pre-event disaster
planning phase as to the apportioning of staff to meet
routine service delivery needs in addition to the manage-
ment of disaster victims.
Finally, the flawed response to Hurricane Katrina
emphasizes the key assumptions that the initial forward
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movement of patients is not likely to occur and that fed-
eral resources are likely to be unavailable for up to three
days following the onset of any disaster event. A surge in
demand for care is going to have to be handled locally,
with locally available resources.
DISCUSSION
Much work has gone into the development of health care
facility surge capacity over the past two years, largely
supported by Department of Health and Human Services
(DHHS) Health Resources and Services Administration
(HRSA) and Department of Homeland Security Urban
Area Security Initiative (UASI) grant funding opportuni-
ties. These grants have helped to fund an initial purchase
of basic medical supplies and equipment. However, these
grants have not provided the amount of funding required
to establish an all-hazards provision of acute care surge
capacity. The benchmarks established for these grants
have been crafted so as to permit a wide variety of solu-
tions applied to the issue of developing surge capacity.
As a result of the absence of specificity, and the relative
paucity of funding, this approach has resulted in piece-
meal solutions to the problem of developing surge
capacity. The amount of available funding for supplies
and equipment has not included any items of significant
cost, such as ventilators, infusion pumps, or cardiac mon-
itoring equipment, for example. It has also not addressed
the rate-limiting step in any surge capacity planning,
namely the ability to recruit, retain, and deploy staff to
the bedside during any given crisis.
As a result, the ability to provide acute and extended
health care delivery in the setting of a surge in demand
for care remains significantly limited. Furthermore, the
planning and funding for medical surge capacity, and
surge capability, remain far behind the other elements
of the nation’s tactical response to creating a secure
homeland. Investments are needed in developing in-
creased capacity at the health care facility level, as well
as at the community level, including the identification of
sites suitable for use as surge (alternate care) facilities.
Given the very real concerns regarding an impending in-
fluenza pandemic, communities must focus on priorities
for building such capacity that goes beyond the purchas-
ing of beds, a metric that is too simplistic, and of little
use, in creating the sort of capacity that is truly needed.
This requires stockpiling of certain key pharmaceuti-
cals, equipment, and supplies. It requires a concerted
focus on developing adequate staffing plans. It suggests
the need for consensus development and dissemination
of altered standardsof care11 and treatment protocols,12,13
reflecting the delivery of health care under the con-
straints of very limited resources.
Funding Requirement Projections
To create local health care surge capacity, whether it
be health care facility based or a combination of the ex-
pansion of health care facility and community solutions,
there are certain items that will need to be in place to fa-
cilitate a cogent, reasonable response to the demand for
acute care. The methodologies by which these funding
requirements are established in this report are somewhat
arbitrary. By use of the nominal group technique, an ex-
pert panel of physicians, nurses, and hospital administra-
tors (two emergency physicians, one pediatric intensivist,
one trauma surgeon, one pediatrician, one anesthesiolo-
gist, one infectious disease expert, one respiratory ther-
apist, three nurses, one pharmacist, and three hospital
administrators) was convened to derive a basic set of
pharmaceuticals, supplies, and equipment that might be
required for the immediate delivery of basic emergency
interventions to victims of a disaster event. The discus-
sions focused on targeting a set number of patients
resulting from all possible types of events, with a partic-
ular focus placed on providing initial burn and trauma
care, as well as antibiotics and supportive care for events
related to infectious etiologies. Specific antidotes for the
management of chemically contaminated casualties were
not included because of the reliance on the Centers for
Disease Control and Prevention–funded Chempack pro-
gram, which provides for the ‘‘forward’’ deployment of
nerve agent antidotes including atropine, pralidoxime
chloride, and benzodiazepines in large quantities under
the Food and Drug Administration Shelf Life Extension
Program. The Strategic National Stockpile purchased
2,124 Chempack containers for distribution in the 50
states and assorted U.S. territories.14 The state of Vir-
ginia, for example, received a total of 48 Chempack con-
tainers.15 The expert panel also did not consider any of
the pharmaceuticals suggested for possible use in the
event of radiologic contamination, because most initial
care is focused on the treatment and management of
any associated wounds and soft tissue injuries. In the
selection of antibiotic agents, the group considered a very
limited range of choices, with those selected having both
indications for known threats and the ability to provide
broad-scale coverage in a variety of clinical settings. The
expert panel also included the provision of the antiviral
agent oseltamivir, given the current exhortations of the
senior leadership of DHHS to plan for local responses
to a possible avian influenza pandemic.
All of the data on costs included in this report repre-
sent estimated wholesale costs and are very preliminary
figures based on rudimentary projections. The pricing
for medical equipment and supplies is based on the expe-
rience of one suburban health care system in negotiating
contracts as a member of a group purchasing organi-
zation. The two largest such organizations negotiate
contracts for critical medical supplies and dominate the
medical purchasing at two thirds of the country’s acute
care hospitals.16 These group purchasing organizations
serve as buying consortiums designed to leverage the
purchasing power of hospitals, which in turn permits
them to qualify for discounts on medical supplies. The
majority of items listed here are available at wholesale
cost, with a few of the supplies having an additional dis-
tribution margin of a few percentage points factored into
the stated costs. All of the pharmaceutical costs included
in this report also represent wholesale costs.
In selecting a very basic cache of pharmaceuticals,
supplies, and equipment that until now have largely
been out of reach of most planners responsible for the
development of health care facility and community surge
capacity, these costs are intended to demonstrate that
even modest purchases of a very limited array of basic
items will be expensive.
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By taking this approach, it is possible to establish a
‘‘ballpark’’ figure that could be used to estimate surge
capacity funding needs by health care planners attempt-
ing to create an all-hazards approach to delivering acute
medical care. This methodology is based on the assump-
tion that patients will be divided among those who have
high, moderate, and low acuity. Furthermore, it is as-
sumed that only those patients of high or moderate acu-
ity will be those who initially require medical resources.
High-acuity patients would require intubation, ventilator
management, or multiple medications, including the use
of vasopressors and intravenous fluids. The moderate-
acuity patients would require medications and intra-
venous fluids. Each of these two categories includes
basic (although not necessarily inexpensive) supplies and
material required for the management of 100 patients
(Tables 1 and 2) that are arbitrarily divided between high-
acuity patients and moderate-acuity patients, simply for
the sake of providing an estimate of costs.
The development of this model does not incorporate
the availability of medications that are an existing part
of the hospital’s ‘‘just in time’’ rotating stock of available
pharmaceuticals. The assumption that is made is that
these medications will be required for existing patient
care needs and that given the sudden spike in demand,
it is this additional cache of resources that will be re-
quired. This model does not take into account issues
related to central storage, maintenance, and cache reha-
bilitation, which would result in additional costs, not
computed for this model.
The decision to focus on 100 patients is based on the
realization that any community could realistically face
the challenge of being called on to handle 100 acutely ill
or injured patients at any given time. Moreover, this
estimate allows for some basic forecasting of funding
requirements that in turn could be applied to any given
jurisdiction for use in its calculation of surge capacity
funding needs based on the HRSA benchmark of man-
aging 500 acutely ill or injured patients per one million
population.
In the category of medical equipment, the major items
listed are ventilators and single- and triple-channel intra-
venous pumps. Given the relative paucity of ventilators
available through the DHHS Strategic National Stockpile
program compared with the number of patients who
might require their use, and given the immediacy with
which patients requiring advanced airway support need
to be placed on ventilators, the availability of ventilators
should be considered a critical metric in the evaluation of
surge capacity. In the Inova Health System, for example,
there are more than 1,500 staffed beds but only 189 ven-
tilators available in four hospitals. Their average rate of
use at any given time is 78%. Some investigators have
recommended that ‘‘hospitals in the same region collab-
oratively plan to develop and maintain a non-federal
stockpile of ventilators that could be rapidly distributed
to hospitals that need them in a crisis.’’12
With regard to the selection of intravenous pumps,
it is recognized that some may consider this a luxury in
times of crisis. However, the simple fact is that most
medications in hospitalized patients are delivered by
this method, suggesting that not to have these units on
hand might further compromise the delivery of emer-
gency care during a disaster event. Given the importance
of providing ‘‘intravenous fluids for resuscitation and
vasopressors to large numbers of hemodynamically un-
stable victims.’’12 inclusion of these pumps seems
reasonable.
In the pharmaceutical category (Table 3), the calcula-
tions for 100 patients are based on the assumption that
they will have to be managed for three days, given the
potential for delay in receiving resupply from the ‘‘push
packs’’ of the Strategic National Stockpile. The selection
of medications is not meant to be definitive or represent
the criterion standard in therapeutic choices, but instead
is intended to illustrate what a representative sample of
urgently required medications might look like and what
their effect on cost would be. In this regard, the list in-
cludes the antiviral medication oseltamivir, given the
current focus on pandemic influenza planning. It also
includes some antibiotic choices that have been proven
successful in the management of one or more of the
CDC Category A bioterrorism agents or are indicated
for broad-spectrum antimicrobial coverage. There are
also a number of medications that would be reasonably
expected to be used for patients of moderate or high
acuity who are receiving intensive-level care.12
Based on these very cursory estimates, and assuming
that these equipment, supplies, and pharmaceuticals are
intended to manage 100 patients, 50 of whom require
intensive, high-acuity level care and 50 of whom require
less intensive but still considerable moderate level of
care, for three days only, a very conservative estimate
of funding requirements for these basic items would be
approximately $1.1 million per 100 patients. Extrapolat-
ing this to match the HRSA benchmarks, any given com-
munity attempting to create surge capacity for the initial
management of 500 patients per one million population
will require in excess of $5 million to fund the purchase
Table 1
Medical and Surgical Supplies for High-acuity Patients
Univent 700 series pressure control
ventilators (unit price $7,000)
$350,000
Triple-channel intravenous pump
(unit price $9,000)
$450,000
Medical gases (oxygen and vacuum
suction)
Assume these are
available
Hospital beds Assume these are
available
Dressings; intravenous catheters/
solutions; endotracheal airways;
Foley catheters; other supplies $25,000
Table 2
Medical and Surgical Supplies for Moderate-acuity Patients
Single-channel intravenous pump
(unit price $3,000)
$150,000
Medical gases (oxygen only) Assume these are available
Portable bedside suction units Assume these are available
Hospital beds Assume these are available
Dressings; intravenous catheters/
solutions; endotracheal airways;
Foley catheters; other supplies $25,000
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of this modest list of basic equipment, supplies, and phar-
maceuticals.
It is important to note that these costs do not take into
account sustainment and ongoing cache management
costs, including those associated with periodic resup-
ply and storage. It is also recognized that many of the
equipment costs represent fixed, one-time expenditures,
whereas the pharmaceutical and supply costs represent
ongoing costs. While these differences will be important
in assessing the long-term costs to maintaining a re-
gional approach to surge capacity funding, it is the im-
mediate, short-term, upfront costs that are the express
focus of this report.
Surge Capacity Staffing Plans
Any discussion on the procurement of these items to
support surge capacity would be incomplete without ad-
dressing the issue of staffing, the single most important
element in the development of a cogent strategy to create
surge capacity. Although it is very difficult to know with
certainty the absolute number of staff who will be avail-
able to provide patient care in an extended disaster event
such as pandemic influenza, steps can be taken to reas-
sure the health care workforce and provide incentives
for them to report for work. Given the geographically
transient nature of the health care workforce, with many
staff living far outside the communities in which they
work, a plan for sustained work shifts has to be devel-
oped and implemented.
One such plan entails the establishment of memoranda
of agreement with the hospitality industry so that hotels
and other similar establishments would retain large
blocks of rooms to be used by the health care workforce
reporting for duty at nearby health care facilities. The
cost for these rooms, and other associated services in-
cluding food, laundry services, and child or elder care,
would be paid by the hospital at a guaranteed rate, estab-
lished in the pre-event planning phase, but below market
value. These arrangements would have to be secured in
the pre-event planning phase, given the possibility of
prices being artificially elevated at times of community
crisis.
An estimate of costs for a single 900-bed hospital,
based on a full census of patients at the hospital, with
full staffing patterns (based on allotted average full-time
equivalent nursing and medical technician positions staf-
fed) and the transition of health care staff to 12-hour
shifts for 96 hours (four shifts, with four off-periods do-
miciled at a local hotel at $100/day, and assuming two
health care staff per hotel room) would be approximately
$80,000 for four days. Note, however, that these costs are
deferred costs, not payable unless or until required due
to circumstances requiring the invocation of those mem-
oranda of agreement. The development of such arrange-
ments, however, is essentially cost-free.
CONCLUSIONS
Although by no means a rigorous economic analysis of
the costs of developing acute health care surge capacity,
this report is intended to explore some of the potential
costs in developing such capacity, particularly as they re-
late to the procurement of basic medical supplies, equip-
ment, and pharmaceuticals. This approach is intended to
highlight the significant costs for developing such capac-
ity by establishing a definable unit cost per 100 patients.
Although there are many limitations to such an ap-
proach, not to mention the recent initiation of discussion
in the medical literature regarding the rationing of care
in large-scale disaster events, any community could face
the need to manage this number of patients at any time.
How many would really be able to handle even a modest
sudden increase in the number of patients requiring
care? How much might it cost to be able to do so?
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